Discussions on akrasia (lack of keep an eye on, or weak spot of will) in Greek philosophy were particularily shiny and excessive for the previous twenty years. regular tales that offered Socrates because the thinker who easily denied the phenomenon, and Plato and Aristotle as rehabilitating it straightforwardly opposed to Socrates, were challenged in lots of other ways. construction on these demanding situations, this collective presents new, and in certain cases hostile methods of interpreting famous in addition to extra missed texts. Its thirteen contributions, written by means of specialists within the box, conceal the complete background of Greek ethics, from Socrates to Plotinus, via Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics (Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Epictetus).

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We can make better sense of Socrates’ remarks, then, if we take him to mean that it is temporal proximity that helps explain when an object comes to have the power of appearance and that Socrates wants us to understand temporal proximity as analogous to spatial proximity. Just as spatial proximity alters the appearance of the size of an object, Socrates thinks, so temporal proximity alters the appearance of the amount of pleasure (or pain) an object will yield. A pleasurable object that provides immediate gratification always appears greater than does the same object when it can only be enjoyed in the future.

Aristotle] writes as though separation is the big differentiator between Plato and Socrates’, says Gail Fine (2003). She thinks this untrue; ‘commitment to separation [‘capacity for independent existence’: 255–6] is as muted in the middle dialogues as lack of commitment to it is in the Socratic dialogues’. ‘Separation is not, however, the only feature Aristotle points to in differentiating Plato from Socrates; and perhaps other of his claims are on firmer ground. Aristotle also claims, for example, that for Socrates, unlike Plato, all universals are sensible, that is, are sensible properties.

19 How different this Socrates is from the essentially a-political, or un-political, Socrates of the Apology, or the Crito, or . . That other Socrates claimed that what 18 At Republic IV, 438a–439b Socrates argues specifically that there are desires (‘appetites’) that are not good-directed (cf. n. 8 above): ‘Therefore, let no one catch us unprepared or disturb us by claiming that no one has an appetite for drink but rather good drink, nor food but good food, on the grounds that everyone after all has appetite for [‘desires’: epithumei ] good things, so that if thirst is an appetite, it will be an appetite for good drink .

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